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FILING FOR PERSONAL 
BANKRUPTCY: ADOPTION OF A 
"BONA FIDE EFFORT" TEST 
UNDER CHAPTER 13 
The number of debtors seeking relief in bankruptcy is one in-
dication of the nation's economic health.1 That number rose to 
421,426 in 19801 - up more than eighty-five percent from 1979.8 
1 The number of bankruptcies in any given year rises as the economy slows down. The 
following statistics show this relationship: 
Unemployment<a) lnflation<hl 
(%) (%) 
1972 5.6 3.4 
1973 4.9 8.8 
1974 5.6 12.2 
1975 8.5 7.0 
1976 7.7 4.8 
1977 7.0 6.8 
1978 
' 
6.0 9.0 
1979 5.8 13.3 
1980 7.1 13.5<h> 
GNfXC) 
(%) 
+5.7 
+5.8 
-0.6 
-1.1 
+5.4 
+5.5 
+4.8 
+3.2 
-0.2 
(a) OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC REPORT (1981), Table B-29. 
Bankruptcies<dl 
(%) 
- 9.2 
- 5.3 
+ 9.4 
+34.3 
- 3.1 
-13.0 
- 5_3<•1 
+11.5<0 
+86.0(g) 
(b) Id., Table B-53. Figures are December-to-December changes based on unadjusted 
. indices. 
(c) Id., Table B-2. Figures represent the change in the Gross National Product from the 
preceding year, expressed in terms of 1972 dollars. 
(d) [1978] ADMIN. OFc. OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS 2 (peti-
tions filed in fiscal 1977) [hereinafter cited as TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS]. 
Figures represent the change from the preceding year of the total number of filings in 
bankruptcy. 
(e) [1979] TABLES OF BANKRUPl'CY STATISTICS, (petitions filed in fiscal year 1978) Table 
F-1 (by computation). 
(0 [1980) TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, (petitions filed in fiscal year 1979) Table 
F-1 (by computation). 
(g) [1981] TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, (petitions filed in fiscal year 1980) Table 
F-1 (by computation). 
(h) The Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 1981, at 4 (table). ~ 
• [1981] TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 1, Table F-1. The previous 
record for the number of petitions filed in a single year was 254,484, set in 1975. [1976] 
TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS (petitions filed in fiscal year 1975) Table F-1. 
• Compare [1981] TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, Table F-1 with [1980] TABLES OF 
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Although most of these debtors filed for Chapter 7 liquidation•, 
twenty-three percent of those who filed voluntary petitions 
chose to take advantage of the wage earner relief chapter of the 
Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 13.11 
The increased use of Chapter 13 underscores the need to re-
solve a recurrent problem: bankruptcy courts across the country 
are using different standards to determine the amount which a 
Chapter 13 debtor must pay to unsecured creditors. The prob-
lem arises from conflicting judicial interpretation of the "good 
faith" test in the Chapter 13 confirmation criteria. Specifically, 
the question is whether or not the test is applicable to the 
amount of payments the debtor proposes to make to such un-
secured creditors. 8 
Last session, Congress debated a Technical Amendments Bill7 
which comprised a series of amendments to the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978.8 Although that bill has not presently been re-
introduced in the 97th Congress, the bill contained a provision 
that would have precluded confirmation of any Chapter 13 plan 
that did not represent a "bona fide effort" by the debtor to re-
pay his creditors. This article recommends enactment of such an 
amendment to the Code, but also maintains that the "bona fide 
effort" test alone is too ambiguous for determining the amount a 
Chapter 13 debtor must pay to creditors with unsecured claims 
and sets forth a set of standard guidelines for bankrqptcy courts 
to use in applying the test. 
BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, Table F-1, supra note 1. 
• 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (Supp. III 1979). For a discussion of Chapter 7 liquidation, see 
Rendleman, Liquidation Bankruptcy Under the '78 Code, 21 WM. & MARY L. RBv. 575 
(1980). 
• Chapter 13 is codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-30 (Supp. III 1979). For a discussion of 
the operation of Chapter 13 and the major advantages of Chapter 13 over Chapter 7, see 
Epstein, Chapter 13: Its Operation, Its Statutory Requirement as to Payment to and 
Classification of Unsecured Claims, and Its Advantages, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1980). 
For a discussion of the theory and history of wage earner relief, see note 10 and accom-
panying text infra. 
• The "good faith" controversy does not reach the handling of secured claims; the 
statute is unambiguous as to how secured claims are to be treated. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 
(a)(5) (Supp. III 1979); Reiley, Secured Creditors and the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 14 
U.S.F. L. REv. 341, 347-48 (1980). 
7 S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
• Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. ,:l549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. III 
1979) and scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 [herein-
after cited as the "Reform Act" or "Act"] is the first complete revision of the federal 
bankruptcy law since 1938. President Carter signed the Reform Act on November 6, 
1978, and it became effective on October 1, 1979. The Act repealed the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898 and replaced it with a new Bankruptcy Code, which is enacted as title 11 of the 
United States Code. For a discussion of the Act's legislative history, see Klee, Legislative 
History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 275 (1980). 
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Part I discusses the history and current application of the 
Chapter 13 wage earner relief provisions, focusing on the present 
"good faith" controversy. Part II analyzes the "bona fide effort" 
test and examines its current congressional status. Part III sug-
gests that more specific statutory guidance is necessary in order 
to effectively apply the "bona fide effort" test and recommends 
specific guidelines for its use. The article concludes that by fol-
lowing such a set of standard guidelines when applying the 
"bona fide effort" test, bankruptcy courts would promote uni-
form treatment of debtors, enhance judicial economy, and facil-
itate appellate review of Chapter 13 cases. 
I. THE CHAPTER 13 WAGE EARNER RELIEF PLAN 
A. History of Wage Earner Relief 
Wage earner relief is an alternative to -liquidation or 
·"straight" bankruptcy. In straight bankruptcy the debtor's non-
exempt assets are liquidated and the proceeds are distributed to 
the debtor's creditors. Once the proceeds are distributed, the 
debtor may or may not be entitled to a discharge of his pre-
bankruptcy debts. 9 
, Wage earner relief allows the debtor to keep his assets and 
still receive a discharge. The debtor promises to pay creditors a 
percentage, if not all, of their allowed claims out of the debtor's 
future earnings. The debtor makes periodic payments to a trus-
tee who in turn distributes appropriate shares to creditors pur-
suant to a court-approved plan. Once payments are completed 
under the plan the debtor is discharged of all debts affected by 
the plan.10 
Wage earner relief has been a part of the federal bankruptcy 
law since 1938 when Congress enacted Chapter XIII of the 
Bankruptcy Code.11 Despite uniform support for its theory, 
debtor use of Chapter XIII was less than expected and geo-
• See note 4 supra. 
1° For a thorough discussion of the theory and history of wage earner relief, see Mer-
rick, Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 56 DEN. L.J. 585, 585-88 (1979). 
11 Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 840, 930 (1938). Chapter XIII is codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 
1001-86 (1976). The Chandler Act added wage earner relief to the federal bankruptcy 
law. The Reform Act, supra note 8, amended Chapter XIII and redesignated it Chapter 
13. In the remainder of this article "Chapter XITI" refers to wage earner relief provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898; "Chapter 13" refers to the wage earner relief chapter of 
the Reform Act. 
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graphically imbalanced.11 The vast majority of debtors contin-
ued to opt for liquidation where "both the debtor and his credi-
tors are the losers."18 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
amended Chapter 13 extensively,1" making it more attractive to 
eligible111 debtors by adding a number of incentives not present 
in Chapter XIII. 16 
Debtors responded quickly to these new incentives. Soon after 
the enactment of the Reform Act there was a drop in the rela-
11 S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, reprinted in (1978) U.S. CooE CONG. 
& Ao. NEWS 5787, 5798; REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, Part I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1973)[hereinafter 
cited as COMMISSION REPORT). To illustrate the geographical imbalance of Chapter XIII 
use, there were 8,806 voluntary petitions filed in the Third Circuit in 1977, of which 246 
(2.8 % ) were in Chapter XIII. That same year there were 31,816 voluntary petitions filed 
in the Fifth Circuit, 7,353 (23.1 % ) of which were in Chapter XIII. [1978) TABLES OF 
BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 1, at Table F-2. 
,. 123 CONG. REC. Hll,699 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977)(remarks of Rep. Edwards). See 
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & 
Ao. NEWS 5963, 6079. 
" These changes are discussed at length in Pickard, The New Bankruptcy Code, Part 
I: A Review of Some of the Significant Changes in Bankruptcy Law, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. 
REV. 177 (1980). 
'" The availability of Chapter 13 relief is restricted to individuals with regular income 
and noncontingent, liquidated unsecured debts of less than $100,000 and noncontingent, 
liquidated, secured debts of less than $350,000. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (Supp. III 1979). 
" Among the many changes brought about by the Reform Act, four are particularly 
significant in making Chapter 13 more appealing to debtors. First, the discharge granted 
under Chapter 13 extinguishes certain kinds of debts that were nondischargeable under 
Chapter XIII. The discharge granted under Chapter XIII was limited to those types of 
debts which were dischargeable in liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1060 (1976). Under Chapter 7 
(liquidation) nine types of debts are non-dischargeable, including, for example, fraud 
judgments, criminal fines, and liability arising from an act of theft or embezzlement. 11 
U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (Supp. III 1979). A Chapter 13 discharge is effective as against all 
types of debts except alimony, maintenance or support, and certain .long-term obliga-
tions specially provided for under the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (Supp. III 1979). 
Second, under certain circumstances the debtor may receive a "hardship discharge" 
despite his failure to complete his proposed payments under the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 
1328(b) (Supp. III 1979) allows the court to grant the debtor a "hardship discharge" 
even though the terms of the plan have not been fully satisfied. The debtor must meet 
three requirements: a) the debtor's failure to complete the plan must not be due to the 
debtor's own fault, b) each unsecured creditor must have actually received an amount at 
least equal to the value of its claim under liquidation as of the effective date of the plan, 
and c) modification of the plan must be impractical. 
Third, a previous discharge in liquidation within the preceding six years no longer bars 
the debtor from receiving a Chapter 13 discharge. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(5) (1976) 
with 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (Supp. III 1979). 
Finally, creditor approval is no longer a prerequisite to confirmation of a plan. Under 
Chapter 13, creditors with unsecured claims have no approval authority. See 11 U.S.C. § 
1325 (Supp. III 1979). A bankruptcy court may confirm a Chapter 13 plan over the ob-
jections of secured creditors if: (1) the holder of each claim is to receive, under the plan, 
value of not less than the allowed amount of its secured claim, or (2) the debtor surren-
ders the property securing such claims to each secured creditor that does not accept the 
plan. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(5)(B)-(C) (Supp. III 1979). 
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tive percentage of voluntary petitions in liquidation, matched by 
a corresponding increase in the relative percentage of voluntary 
petitions filed in Chapter 13.17 Some debtors realized that the 
criteria for confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan might allow a 
debtor to receive a discharge of unsecured debts without making 
any payments to holders of unsecured claims.18 
B. Criteria for Confirmation of a Chapter 13 Plan 
Section 1325 of the Code provides in pertinent part: 
(a) The court shall confirm a plan if-
* * * 
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and 
not by any means forbidden by law; 
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, 
of property to be distributed under the plan on ac-
count of each allowed unsecured claim is not less 
than the amount that would be paid on such claim if 
the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chap-
ter 7 of this title on such date; 
* * * 
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments 
under the plan and to comply with the plan.19 
The statute does not expressly grant bankruptcy courts the dis-
17 The change in the relative percentage of voluntary petitioners seeking wage earner 
relief is illustrated by the following statistics: !\ 
Total 
Voluntary 
Filings Chapter Vll/7 Chapter XIII/13 
19781•> 201,944 167,776 30,185 
(83%) (15%) 
1979(b) 225,549 182,344 39,442 
(81 %) (17%) 
1980(c) 297,164 223,765 67,825 
(75%) (23%) 
(a) (1979) TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 2, at Table F-2 (covering the 
12 month period ended June 30, 1978). 
(b) (1980) TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 2, at. Table F-2 (covering the 
12 month period ended June 30, 1979). 
(c) (1981) TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 2, at Table F-2A (covering the 
12 month period ended September 30, 1980). 
18 See notes 21-23 and accompanying text infra. 
•• 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (Supp. III 1979). 
(, 
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cretion to consider the debtor's ability to pay in determining the 
minimum amount required for confirmation. Some courts, how-
ever, have found such discretion to be implicit in the "good 
faith" test of section 1325(a)(3). 
1. Section 1325(a)(4) and the debtor's ability to pay- Sec-
tion 1325(a)(6) establishes an upper limit on the amount the 
debtor may propose to pay: the plan may not call for payments 
that exceed the debtor's ability to pay. However, since the 
debtor is unlikely to propose payments which he or she cannot 
afford, this subsection is seldom at issue. 20 The difficulty lies in 
ascertaining the minimum amount the debtor is legally obligated 
to pay to holders of unsecured claims. 
Section 1325(a)(4) is the only confirmation criterion expressly 
applicable to the minimum amount the debtor must pay. This 
section is referred to as the "best interest of creditors" test.21 It 
requires only that creditors with un~ecured claims receive an 
amount under the plan "not less than"22 that which they would 
receive if the debtor's estate were liquidated under Chapter 7.28 
Thus, if liquidation would leave no assets to apply against un-
secured claims, the debtor satisfies section 1325(a)(4) with a 
plan that proposes no payment to the holders of such claims. 
A bankruptcy court, when making the section 1325(a)(4) cal-
culation, has no discretion to take into account the debtor's abil-
ity to pay.s. Moreover, confirmation of a plan is not discretion-
ary with the court if all the criteria in section 1325 are 
•• Occasionally, a debtor who is desperate to avoid liquidation will propose payments 
higher than he can reasonably be expected to maintain over the life of the plan. See, e.g., 
In re Lucas, 6 B.C.D. 82 (S.D. Cal. 1980) (debtor with disposable income of $84 per 
month proposed payments of $82 per month; confirmation denied). 
11 See, e.g., In re Iacavoni, 2 Bankr. Rep. 256, 262 (D. Utah 1980). 
11 Some debtors have argued that if Congress had intended to preclude confirmation 
of no-payment plans it would have phrased this section to read "more than," instead of 
"not less than." It appears more likely, however, that Congress had in mind the case in 
whi<;h a debtor would be able to satisfy one hundred percent of allowed unsecured claims 
under Chapter 7 liquidation. A requirement in Chapter 13 that he pay "more than" one 
hundred percent would be anomalous if not bizarre. Id. at 266. 
13 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (Supp. III 1979). 
•• See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (Supp. III 1979). The section requires the court to make 
and compare two determinations. First, the court is to determine the amount each un-
secured creditor would receive if the debtor's estate were liquidated on the effective date 
of the plan. The court must then compare this amount to the amount that the debtor 
proposes to pay to each unsecured creditor under the plan. If the latter figure is equal to 
or greater than the former, the plan satisfies the test. No court has ever suggested that 
this section might be interpreted as allowing the court discretion to consider the debtor's 
ability to pay when making these determinations. 
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satisfied. H This lack of discretion may give rise to situations 
which Congress obviously did not foresee. 26 
2. Judicial interpretation of "good faith"- If section 
1325(a)(4) gives the court no discretion to consider the debtor's 
ability to pay, the question arises whether such discretion may 
be found elsewhere in section 1325. Many creditors have argued 
that the answer lies in section 1325(a)(3), the "good faith" test. 
As the only other confirmation criterion that arguably affords 
the court discretion to consider the debtor's ability to pay,27 the 
"good faith" test has become the source of a considerable vol-
ume of litigation. 
Chapter 13 debtors have consistently argued that the mini-
mum level of payments required for confirmation is to be deter-
mined solely by reference to section 1325(a)( 4) and that section 
1325(a)(3) only applies with respect to the debtor's reasons for 
filing. 28 On the other hand, creditors and trustees29 opposing 
confirmation of a plan generally argue that a no-payment plan 
cannot be held to be submitted in good faith because such a 
plan does not promote the spirit or purpose of Chapter 13. 80 
Nothing in the text pr legislative history of the Reform Act ex-
11 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 1325.01(1) (15th ed. 1980). 
•• Consider, for example, the following hypothetical involving debtors H and W, a 
married couple. H has recently graduated from medical school and W from law school. 
They have one secured debt in the amount of $500. Additionally, they have ten un-
secured debts which total $100,000. They have no nonexempt assets. H and W submit a 
Chapter 13 plan which provides for full payment of the secured claim and one dollar to 
each of the ten creditors with unsecured claims. Since they have no assets to liquidate, 
their plan satisfies § 1325(a)(4). Thus if§ 1325(a)(4) is held to be the sole criterion gov-
erning the amount H and W must pay to unsecured creditors, the court must confirm the 
plan, despite the fact that H and W's starting salaries are expected to exceed $75,000. 
Although Congress, in enacting Chapter 13, did not intend such a result, it is a possibil-
ity if the courts have no discretion to take into account the debtor's ability to pay. 
17 With the exception of § 1325(a)(6), which has no application to the minimum 
amount of payments, the remaining criteria in § 1325 are straightforward; that is, the 
plan either satisfies them or it does not. There is no subjective element to their applica-
tion. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (Supp. III 1979). 
18 See, e.g., In re Beaver, 2 Bankr. Rep. 337, 340 (S.D. Cal. 1980). 
18 In In re Terry, 3 Bankr. Rep. 63 (W.D. Ark. 1980), the trustee objected to the con-
firmation of a "zero" (no-payment) plan because he, just as the rest of the creditors, 
would receive nothing for his services. The court brushed aside this argument, stating, 
"[a] wag might suggest that poetic justice has been achieved and, indeed, that it might 
be therapeutic for trustees to join the ranks of unpaid creditors." Id. at 66. 
80 Creditors argue that the purpose of Chapter 13 is to allow debtors to pay their debts 
over a period of time rather than liquidate; debtors, on the other hand, argue that the 
purpose of Chapter 13 is to give the debtor a "fresh start." See, e.g., id. at 65-66. _Numer-
ous citations can be gleaned from the text and legislative history of the Reform Act to 
support either view. This topic is examined at great length in In re Hurd, 4 Bankr. Rep. 
551, 554-60 (W.D. Mich. 1980). 
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pressly addresses the meaning of "good faith."31 Yet three dis-
tinct trends have emerged as bankruptcy courts continue to de-
cide the "good faith" issue on a case-by-case basis. 
A small minority of courts have held that a Chapter 13 plan 
cannot satisfy section 1325(a)(3) unless it proposes repayment of 
at least seventy percent of the debtor's allowed unsecured debts 
and represents the debtor's best effort to repay all creditors in 
full. 33 Other courts have held that section 1325(a)(3) does not 
pertain to the amount of payments proposed by the plan33 and 
11 See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 1325.01[2l[C] (15th ed. 1980). Furthermore, there 
is not a single reported case construing a similar good-faith requirement in Chapter XIII. 
There are two probable explanations for the lack of case law under Chapter XIII. First, 
the creditors had no need to challenge the plan for lack of good faith, since they could 
block confirmation of a plan simply by withholding their approval. See note 16 supra. 
Second, the majority of plans confirmed proposed a very high percentage of repayment. 
[1969) TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 1. For example, in 1968 there were 
10,341 Chapter XIII plans confirmed. These plans covered debts totalling $22,358,939. 
The amount to be paid under these plans totalled $21,262,098-95.1 % of all debts owed. 
Id. at Table F-11. At this level of proposed repayment, the creditors could not credibly 
argue bad faith . 
.. In re Burrell, 2 Bankr. Rep. 650 (N.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd, 6 Bankr. Rep. 361 (N.D. 
Cal. 1980) (payments must be substantial, but not necessarily 70% of allowed unsecured 
claims or debtor's best effort); In re Raburn, 4 Bankr. Rep. 624 (M.D. Ga. 1980). The 
bankruptcy court in Burrell, although later reversed by the district court, decided that 
Congress could not have intended to grant a debtor all the benefits of Chapter 13 with-
out creating a reciprocal obligation on the debtor's part to repay creditors in full or at 
least in substantial part. The court extrapolated its definition of "substantial" from § 
727(a)(9) of the Code. That section governs the availability of a discharge under Chapter 
7 in the case of a debtor who has received a Chapter 13 "hardship discharge" within the 
preceding six years. The previous Chapter 13 discharge does not bar the debtor from 
receiving a Chapter 7 discharge provided that the payments the debtor proposed under 
his Chapter 13 plan totalled at least 70% of allowed unsecured claims and represented 
the debtor's best effort. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9) (Supp. II 1979). The bankruptcy court was 
undaunted by the conspicious absence of any such requirement in the Chapter 13 confir-
mation criteria, dismissing it as a simple oversight by Congress. Burrell, 2 Bankr. Rep. at 
653. 
The bankruptcy court in Burrell apparently overlooked a part of the Reform Act's 
legislative history that dispels the court's "oversight" theory. The "best effort" proviso to 
§ 727(a)(9) was explained to the House and Senate in this manner: 
It is expected that the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will contain a provision 
permitting the debtor to request a determination of whether a plan is the 
debtor's "best effort" prior to confirmation of [his plan]. 
124 CONG. REc. Hll,098 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978)(remarks of Rep. Edwards); 124 CONG. 
REc. S17,415 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978)(remarks of Sen. DeConcini). The statement antici-
pates the confirmation of some Chapter 13 plans that do not represent the debtor's best 
effort. If a plan had to represent the debtor's best effort in order to he confirmed, the 
debtor would have no reason to request the determination referred to in the statement. 
Thus, it is inappropriate to infer a "best effort" requirement in § 1325(a)(3). 
•• See In re Berry, 5 Bankr. Rep. 515, 517 (S. D. Ohio 1980); In re Bellgraph, 4 Bankr. 
Rep. 421,423 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Harland, 3 Bankr. Rep. 597, 599 (D. Neb. 1980); In 
re Cloutier, 3 Bankr. Rep. 584, 586 (D. Colo. 1980); In re Thebeau, 3 Bankr. Rep. 537, 
538 (E.D. Ark. 1980), In re Sadler, 3 Bankr. Rep. 536, 538 (E.D. Ark. 1980); In re Terry, 
3 Bankr. Rep. 63, 65 (W.D. Ark. 1980). These courts based their decisions on a finding 
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will confirm a no-payment plan provided it satisfies section 
1325(a)(4). 
Most ban].cruptcy courts, however, have taken a position some-
where between these two extremes. The majority of courts have 
held that section 1325(a)(3) pertains to the amount of the pro-
posed payments: unless there are exceptional circumstances, 
"good faith" requires that at least some payments be proposed. 
Additionally, to satisfy the "good faith" test, the proposed pay-
ments must be "meaningful" or "substantial."3" 
The Bankruptcy Code is intended to be a uniform law on the 
subject of bankruptcy. 311 The treatment of debtors who file in 
Chapter 13, however, has been far from uniform. The standards 
for confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan vary widely from state to 
state and even among the districts within a single state. 38 Some 
type of corrective action, either by Congress or the courts, must 
be taken if the Act is to be applied equally to similarly situated 
debtors. 
II. THE "BONA FIDE EFFORT" TEST 
A. Legislative History of the Technical Amendments Bill 
and Current Congressional Status 
Congress hurriedly passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act in the 
that there is no statutory basis for reading a minimum payment requirement into § 
1325(a)(3). See also Epstein, supra note 5, at 13. 
"' See, e.g., In re Hurd, 4 Bankr. Rep. 551, 558 (W.D. ,'-{ich. 1980); In re lacavoni, 2 
Bankr. Rep. 256, 265-68 (D. Utah 1980). These courts have determined that the legisla-
tive history of Chapter 13 implies an obligation on the part of a Chapter 13 debtor to 
make at least a meaningful attempt to repay creditors with unsecured claims. 
81 Although the Reform Act has no official title, the heading of Title 11, U.S.C. reads: 
"An Act to establish a uniform Law on the Subject of Bankruptcies." 92 Stat. 2549. 
Moreover, the U.S. Constitution expressly grants Congress the power to establish "uni-
form Laws on the Subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
ae Compare In re Raburn, 4 Bankr. Rep. 624 (M.D. Ga. 1980)(§ 1325(a)(3) requires 
70% payment of unsecured claims and plan must represent debtor's best effort) with In 
re Terry, 3 Bankr. Rep. 63, 66 (W.D. Ark. 1980) (§1325(a)(3) is inapplicable to amount of 
proposed payments) and In re Cook, 6 B.C.D. 219 (S.D. W. Va. 1980)(§ 1325(a)(3) re-
quires payments commensurate with the extent to which the debtor is invoking the spe-
cial relief afforded by Chapter 13). See also In re Beaver, 2 Bankr. Rep. 337 (S.D. Cal. 
1980)(§ 1325(a)(3) requires "meaningful attempt" to repay or adjust debts); In re Goeb, 
6 BCD 628, 630 (S.D. Cal. 1980)(§ 1325(a)(3) requires the debtor to deal fairly and equi-
tably with all creditors); In re Howard, 5 B.C.D. 1375, 1376 (S.D. Cal. 1980)(§ 1325(a)(3) 
requires a plan calling for substantial payments to creditors). 
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closing sessions of the 95th Congress.37 As a result, the Act con-
tains many technical and substantive errors. 38 The Technical 
Amendments Bill, debated but not enacted by the 96th Con-
gress, was intended to correct these errors. 39 The following dis-
cussion examines how the Bill addressed the "good faith" issue, 
why Congress chose this particular solution, and, most impor-
tantly, the extent to which the amendment should actually have 
resolved the controversy. 
Section 127(b) of the Bill would have amended section 
1325(a)(4) of the Reform Act to read as follows: 
(a) The court shall confirm a plan if-
• • * 
( 4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of 
property to be distributed under the plan on ac-
count of each allowed unsecured claim is not less 
than the amount that would be paid on such claim if 
the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chap-
ter 7 of this title on such date, and such plan repre-
sents the debtor's bona fide effort. . . •0 
The Bill's legislative history"1 explains how Congress in-
tended the. courts to apply the various tests found in sections 
1325(a)(3) and 1325(a)(4). Section 1325(a)(3) - the "good faith" 
test - applies only with respect to the debtor's motive or pur-
pose for filing in Chapter 13.49 The first part of section 
1325(a)(4) - the "best interest of creditors" test - establishes 
an absolute minimum limit below which the level of proposed 
payments may not drop, regardless of the debtor's particular cir-
•
1 See Klee, supra note 8, at 292 . 
.. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980). 
•• Id. 
•• 126 CONG. REC. Hll,735 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (italicized portion added by pro-
posed amendment). 
•
1 In its original version, the Technical Amendments Bill would have added a "best 
effort" requirement to § 1325(a)(5). S. REP. No. 96-305, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1980). 
The House amended the Bill, changing "best effort" to "good faith effort." H.R. REP. 
No. 96-1195, supra note 38, at 24. The Senate amended the Bill once again, this time by 
dropping the "good faith effort" from § 1325(a)(3) and adding a "bona fide effort" re-
quirement to § 1325(a)(4). 126 CONG. REc. S15,175 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980). The House 
accepted the "bona fide effort" requirement without change. 126 CONG. REc. Hll,735 
(daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980). 
41 The "good faith" test is intended to preclude confirmation of a plan which the 
debtor does not intend to implement as proposed, or where the proposed plan, if consu-
mated, would contravene the spirit or purposes of Chapter 13. An example of such a plan 
would be one in which the debtor's purpose is to render himself incapable of meeting 
alimony or support obligations. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1195, supra note 38, at 24. 
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cumstances.48 To satisfy the "bona fide effort" test a Chapter 13 
plan would have had to represent a sincere and honest effort by 
the debtor to pay a significant percentage, if not all, of the 
debtor's unsecured debts.•• 
B. Merits of the Bona Fide Effort Test 
Congress intended Chapter 13 to "enable an individual, under 
court supervision and protection, to develop and perform under 
a plan for the repayment of his debts over an extended pe-
riod. "411 As enacted, however, Chapter 13 permits confirmation 
of plans proposing few or no payments to unsecured creditors. 
As a result, it has become, in the words of Senator DeConcini, 
one of the principle proponents of the Reform Act, "the most 
misused and abused portion of the Bankruptcy Code. "48 The 
purpose of the "bona fide effort" test is to put an end to this 
abuse and preserve the historical spirit and intent of Chapter 13: 
to provide a legitimate alternative for the hardpressed debtor 
who honestly wants to pay his debts. 
Yet, standards less ambiguous than this are clearly possible. 
One possibility would be to require Chapter 13 debtors to pay at 
least a specified percentage of their unsecured debts.47 Another 
would be to require debtors to pay as much as they possibly 
could under the circumstances. 48 Either of these standards 
would be easier to apply to a particular set of facts than the 
more nebulous concept of a "bona fide effort." Nonetheless, both 
options are unacceptable. Establishing a minimum percentage 
requirement would severely restrict a bankruptcy court's discre-
tion and possibly work to the detriment of both debtor and 
creditor.49 A "best effort" requirement would deter eligible debt-
•• 126 CONG. REc. Sl5,l 75 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980)(remarks of Sen. DeConcini). 
H /d. 
46 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 13, at 118. 
•• 126 CONG. REc. Sl5,175 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980)°(remarks of Sen. DeConcini). 
" See note 32 supra, for a discussion of how two bankruptcy courts have attempted to 
establish such a requirement. See also In re Curtis, 2 Bankr. Rep. 43, 45 (W.D. Mo. 
·1980), where the court, in dictum, stated that, as a "rule of thumb," a debtor demon-
strates his good faith by proposing to pay at least 10% of his take-home pay for three 
years, subject to exceptional circumstances. 
" The original version of the Technical Amendments Bill would have had this result. 
See S. REP. No. 96-305, note 41 supra. 
" Consider the following hypothetical situation: Congress amends § 1325 so that no 
plan can be confirmed unless it proposes payments equal to or greater than 50% of the 
debtor's unsecured debts. A debtor filea in Chapter 13; liquidation of the debtor's assets 
would leave nothing for creditors with unsecured claims. The debtor proposes payments 
that would equal 45% of the unsecured debts, and the plan represents the debtor's beat 
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ors from filingao and thus conflict with Congress' stated policy of 
encouraging eligible debtors to take advantage of Chapter 13.a1 
The "bona fide effort" requirement would give a court the dis-
cretion it needs to insure that debtors who take advantage of 
Chapter 13 do not take advantage of their unsecured creditors as 
well. The extent to which it would resolve the "good faith" issue 
would depend, however, on how the courts exercise that discre-
tion. To appreciate the practical difficulties courts would experi-
ence in attempting to apply the "bona fide effort" requirement, 
it is helpful to consider the fundamental questions involved in 
the present "good faith" issue. 
The crux of the "good faith" issue is how a bankruptcy court 
should determine the minimum amount a Chapter 13 debtor 
must pay to creditors with unsecured claims. The answer de-
pends on whether the section 1325(a)(4) "best interest of credi-
tors" test is the sole criterion by which to judge such payments. 
If the court decides it is not, it needs to decide whether the stan-
dard should be the "good faith" test or some other standard. 
However, the minimum amount inquiry does not end here. As 
the cases illustrate, even when the courts agree which standard 
applies, nonuniform interpretation or application of the stan-
dard yields disparate results. u Thus, resolution of the issue 
effort. In this situation the debtor and his creditors would lose: the debtor because he is 
forced to liquidate; the creditors because they will receive nothing, where, had the plan 
been confirmed, they would at least have gotten 45% of their claims. 
"" A "best effort" requirement would tend to discourage the type of debtor who needs 
Chapter 13 the most. A debtor with few debts or a high income, or both, might be able to 
pay his debts entirely with little sacrifice. The debtor with a large amount of debts and 
low income, however, is in a different situation. For him, a "best effort" would presuma-
bly mean making payments that would put his plan just at the § 1325(a)(6) "feasibility" 
level or very close to it. The prospect of having to pay all his disposable income for three 
years is enough to discourage anyone from filing under Chapter 13. 
The Bankruptcy Commission found that one of the reasons for the limited use of 
Chapter XIII was that debtors were often pressured into attempting to pay too much. 
The pressure came from several sources. Creditors were likely to object if a plan pro-
vided for less than a substantial percentage of their claims. In addition, since a plan 
calling for a small percentage of repayment would entail a disproportionate amount of 
paperwork for the court, the trustee, and the attorney, debtors were encouraged to opt 
for liquidation if they could not pay all their debts under the plan. As a result, many 
debtors assumed a commitment to pay the full amount of their indebtedness when it was 
really not realistic for them to do so. Due to unforeseen expenses, loss of income, or other 
circumstances, many failed to keep up their payments and the "mortality rate" of Chap-
ter XIII plans was very high. Those debtors not willing to take the risk simply liqui-
dated. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 160-61. 
•• The House Report states: "In the consumer area, proposed Chapter 13 encourages 
more debtors to repay their debts over an extended period rather than to opt for straight 
bankruptcy liquidation and discharge." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 13, at 5. 
•• Compare In re Raburn, 4 Bankr. Rep. 624 (M.D. Ga. 1980)("good faith" requires 
70% payment of unsecured claims and debtor's best effort) with In re Curtis, 2 Bankr. 
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turns on the answer to a third question: once the standard is 
identified, how do the courts apply that standard to achieve uni-
form, equitable treatment of all Chapter 13 debtors and credi-
tors? The "bona fide effort" test answers the first two ques-
tions;113 its shortcoming is that it fails to answer the third. This 
shortcoming is most evident in cases where liquidation would 
leave nothing for creditors with unsecured claims. 
In such cases there will normally be a significant difference 
between the minimum limit set by the "best interest of credi-
tors" test and the maximum limit set by section 1325(a)(6).11' It 
is not clear at what point between these limits a proposed plan 
amounts to a bona fide effort. The court would determine this 
amount by taking into account "all the circumstances of the 
debtor."1111 The broad scope of this discretion is likely to foster a 
controversy substantially similar to the one the amendment pur-
ports to resolve. Whereas the "good faith" controversy centers 
around the confirmability of no-payment plans, a similar contro-
versy could be expected to develop over ten, fifteen, or twenty 
percent plans. Unless there is a consensus among the courts as 
to the proper interpretation and application of the "bona fide 
effort" test, the situation that exists now would continue, only in 
a slightly different form. A debtor filing in Arkansas, for exam-
ple, would be confident that his thirty percent plan will be con-
firmed, whereas a debtor filing in the Northern District of Cali-
fornia would be wasting time if he submitted anything less than 
a sixty percent plan.118 
Adoption of a "bona fide effort" test is a necessary first step 
towards resolution of the "good faith" controversy. The test 
Rep. 43 (W.D. Mo. 1980)("good faith" requires payments of at least 10% of debtor's 
take-home pay) and In re Goeb, 6 B.C.D. 628 (S.D. Cal. 1980)("good faith" requires 
debtors to deal fairly and equitably with creditors). See also In re Hurd, 4 Bankr. Rep. 
551 (W.D. Mich. 1980)("good faith" requires meaningful payments to creditors with un-
secured claims). 
•• The test makes it clear that the "best interest of creditors" test is not the sole 
criterion with respect to the minimum amount of payments required for confirmation. It 
also identifies the standard thst is to be used: the "bona fide effort" test. 
04 The closer the debtor's plan comes to the "feasibility" limit of § 1325(a)(6), the 
easier it is to make the "bona fide effort" determination. A "best effort" subsumes, per 
se, the concept of a "bona fide effort." 
00 See note 43 supra . 
.. These jurisdictions are used as examples merely to point out that a particular 
judge's attitude toward the purpose of Chspter 13, or the theory of wage earner relief in 
general, may influence his interpretation of a given standard. Compare In re Terry, 3 
Bankr. Rep. 63 (W.D. Ark. 1980)(purpose of Chapter 13 is to give debtor a "fresh start"; 
no-payment plan confirmed) with In re Burrell, 2 Bankr. Rep. 650 (N.D. Cal. 1980)(pur-
pose of Chapter 13 is to encourage full-payment plans and substantial-payment plans; 
15% plan denied confirmation). 
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would identify the standard bankruptcy courts should use to de-
termine the minimum amount a Chapter 13 debtor must pay to 
creditors with unsecured claims. The issue will not be laid to 
rest, however, until more specific guidelines are available to aid 
debtors in proposing acceptable plans and to assist courts in ap-
plying the new standard in a uniform, equitable manner. 
III. PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR USE OF THE "BONA FIDE 
EFFORT" TEST 
The "bona fide effort" test would give a bankruptcy court the 
discretion it needs to strike an equitable balance between the 
conflicting interests of Chapter 13 debtors and creditors:17 But 
in exercising its discretion the bankruptcy judiciary should 
strive for uniform interpretation and application of the stan-
dards set by Congress. Short of restricting the court's discretion 
altogether, 118 the most effective way to achieve uniform interpre-
tation and application of the "bona fide effort" test is through 
the use of standard guidelines. If Congress adds a "bona fide 
effort" test to Chapter 13 by amendment to the Code, a set of 
uniform guidelines should be featured prominentlr in the 
amendment's legislative history to make it clear that Congress 
intends the courts to address and discuss each guideline in every 
Chapter 13 case. 119 In the absence of express Congressional ac-
tion, bankruptcy courts should adopt and adhere to such recom-
mended guidelines sua sponte.60 
•• In Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966), Justice Douglas said, "There 
is an overriding consideration that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy 
jurisdiction." 
08 See notes 46-50 and accompanying text supra. 
•• See note 100 infra, for a discussion of Johnson v. Georgia Highway Expr8!!9, Inc., 
488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)(held district court must consider twelve specific guidelines 
in deciding whether to award attorney's fees in a Title VII action). Two years after the 
Johnson court set forth the appropriate guidelines, Congress enacted the Civil Rights 
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976)(amending 
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)), which allows a court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party in suits brought to enforce certain civil rights acts. Congress expressly recognized 
the appropriateness of the Johnson guidelines for determining the reasonableness of at-
torneys' fees claimed by the prevailing party. S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 
reprinted in (1976) U.S. Coos CONG. & AD. Nsws 5908, 5913. 
00 See note 100 and accompanying text infra. 
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A. A Proposed Set of Standard Guidelines 
Bankruptcy courts should use the following guidelines m ap-
plying the "bona fide effort" test in Chapter 13 cases:61 
•
1 The Technical Amendments Bill will probably be enacted during the current ses-
sion of Congress. The House and Senate agreed last session on the form of the section 
that addresses the "good faith" controversy. See note 41 supra. Thus, it is safe to assume 
that if the Bill does pass it will be in its present form with respect to the "bona fide 
effort" test. If the Bill fails to pass, however, the courts will be left in a difficult situation. 
On the one hand, it is now clear that Congress never intended the "best interest of credi-
tors test" to be the sole criterion with respect to the minimum amount Chapter 13 debt-
ors must pay to unsecured creditors. 126 CONG. REC. S15,175 (daily ed. Dec. 1. 1980)(re-
marks of Sen. DeConcini). On the. other hand, however, the courts cannot use this 
information as authority to read a "bona fide effort" test into § 1325(a)(3). The question 
remains whether bankruptcy courts should continue to use the "good faith" test to re-
. quire Chapter 13 debtors to make "mean_ingful" or "substantial" payments. 
Dean Epstein argues that they should not. Epstein, supra note 5, at 13. His conclusion 
is supported by two observations. First, he points out that there is no statutory basis for 
such a requirement. Second, he argues that there would be serious problems with the 
practical application of a standard as subjective as. "meaningful" or "substantial" pay-
ments. Id .. 
The argument.that there is no statutory basis for such a requirement is simplistic. It 
suggests that a court has no power to disregard form for substance, to hold that a trans-
action that complies with the literal terms of a statute is not within its spirit. The courts 
should follow the long-standing rule cited by Chief Justice Burger that "when interpret-
ing· a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause . . . but will take in 
connection with it the whole statute . . . and the objects and policy of the law, as indi-
cated by its various provisions, and give to it such a construction as will carry out the 
· will of the Legislature .... " Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1973), (citing 
Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 (1857)). Several courts have examined the legisla-
tive history of Chapter 13 and federal bankruptcy law in general, and have reached the 
conclusion that a literal reading of the Chapter 13 confirmation criteria would yield re-
sults that contr~vene the spirit and purpose of Chapter 13 and the entire Bankruptcy 
Code. The scholarly opinions of Judge Mabey and Judge Nims provide persuasive sup-
port for this position. See In re Iacavoni, 2 Bankr. Rep. 256 (D. Utah 1980); In re Hurd, 
4 Bankr. Rep. 551 (W.D. Mich. 1980). Thus far, over thirty courts have reached the same 
conclusion. Apparently, however, Dean Epstein's article was prepared very early in 1980, 
before these opinions were available. See Epstein, supra note 5, at 1. 
Dean Epstein's second argument is that a "meaningful" or "substantial" payment 
standard is too subjective to achieve uniform results. Epstein, supra note 5, at 13. That, 
of course, is the thesis of this article: such a requirement, whether phrased in terms of 
"meaningful" payments or "bona fide effort," is by itself likely to yield disparate results. 
An easy solution to the problem, as Dean Epstein suggests, is to avoid it altogether and 
stick with the "best interest of creditors" test. But a bankruptcy court is a court of 
equity, 28 U.S.C. § 1481, and courts of equity are expected to deal with difficult 
problems. The proper approach is to strive for uniform application of the standard with-
out sacrificing the court's discretion. This can be accomplished through the use of stan-
dard guidelines. 
Thus, if Congress fails to require a "bona fide effort" test as in the Technical Amend-
ments Bill, or otherwise, bankruptcy courts should use the "good faith" test to require 
Chapter 13 debtors to propose "meaningful" or "substantial" payment to holders of un-
secured claims. This standard can be expressed as a "good faith effort" requirement. The 
recommended guidelines are as applicable to a "good faith eff<>rt" test as they are to a 
"bona fide effort" test. Courts could then use the recommended guidelines, substituting 
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1. The ratio of proposed payments to the debtor's total in-
debtedness- In discussing the impact of a "bona fide effort" 
standard, Senator DeConcini stated that the test "envisions ... 
payments . . . that represent a significant percentage, if not all, 
of the debts owed."811 He made no attempt, however, to define 
the parameters of a "significant" percentage. 83 The statement, 
though ambiguous, effectively conveys two thoughts. First, it ex-
presses Congress' expectation that the average Chapter 13 plan 
will provide for a high percentage of repayment. But at the same 
time, it leaves to the court's discretion the ultimate determina-
tion, i.e., whether or not, in view of "all the circumstances of 
[the] debtor,"84 the payments represent a "significant" percent-
age of the debts owed. Thus, the courts should make this deter-
mination on a case-by-case basis, rather than by establishing ar-
bitrary repayment levels for confirmation. 8~ 
The proscription against setting arbitrary percentage levels as 
a requirement for confirmation does not mean that the percent-
age of repayment is not relevant. Courts should compare the 
amount the debtor proposes to pay with the minimum amount 
allowed by the "best interest of creditors" test. The "bona fide 
effort" test calls for a "sincere good faith effort" by the debtor.86 
By proposing to make payments that barely exceed the "best 
interest of creditors" test the debtor casts doubt on his sincerity. 
If the debtor's payments would only slightly exceed the mini-
mum limit, closer scrutiny of the plan is in order. 
The court might also find it useful to set certain percentage 
levels to indicate which party is to bear the burden of proving or 
disproving the existence of a "bona fide effort." For example, a 
court might say that a ninety-percent repayment plan is a prima 
facie "bona fide effort" and the creditors would have to prove 
that it is not. Conversely, a plan calling for less than ten percent 
repayment would be presumed not to represent a "bona fide ef-
fort" and the debtor would have to prove that the circumstances 
justify the sm_all amount. In other words, the percentage levels 
would not be used to automatically determine the confirmability 
of a Chapter 13 plan; they would be used only to determine 
which party must come forward with evidence to prove or dis-
prove the existence of a "bona fide effort." 
"good faith effort" for "bona fide effort." 
•• 126 CONG. REC. S15,175 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). 
•• Id. 
64 Id. 
•• Id.; H.R. REP. No. 96-1195 supra note 38, at 25. 
""126 CONG. REC. S15,175 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). 
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2. Unusual circumstances relating to the debtor's indebted-
ness- A court should take into account any unusual or suspi-
cious circumstances surrounding the debtor's indebtedness. For 
example, the debtor might have incurred an inordinate number 
or amount of unsecured debts within a short period of time 
before filing. 66•1 A court might reasonably conclude that the 
debtor, contemplating bankruptcy, went on a "spending spree" 
in hopes of obtaining a subsequent discharge for a large percent-
age of his debts. Under these circumstances the court should 
give the debtor a choice to either pay the debts in full or file 
under Chapter 7. 67 
3. The debtor's ability to pay- When evaluating a Chapter 
13 plan a court must keep in mind Congress' goal of encouraging 
eligible debtors to take advantage of wage earner relief instead 
of liquidation.68 For this reason, a court should not impose un-
due financial hardship on the debtor69 or require of him an abso-
lute "best effort."70 On the other hand, the court must also bear 
in mind that the removal of creditor control in Chapter 13 cases 
has made the court the sole protector of creditors' interests.71 
Consideration of the debtor's ability to pay allows the court to 
further both goals: debtors are not discouraged by overburden-
some payments, and creditors are protected from being taken 
advantage of by debtors who have the ability but not the will-
ingness to make an honest attempt to repay their debts. Thus, 
this factor is the touchstone of the "bona fide effort" test. 
Case law provides little guidance with respect to how courts 
should evaluate a debtor's ability to pay. This is because most 
cases in which the matter was at issue involved no-payment 
plans or plans that barely satisfied the "best interest of credi-
tors" test.72 In such cases it is usually clear that the debtor has 
the ability to pay more; therefore, the court is able to deny con-
firmation of the plan without going into a detailed analysis of 
the debtor's ability to pay. However, the adoption of a "bona 
fide effort" test would deter debtors from submitting such 
... , See, e.g., In re Frederickson, 5 Bankr. Rep. 199 (M.D. Fla. 1980), where the debtor, 
a shipping clerk with over fifty credit cards, had incurred over $100,000 in unsecul'ed 
debts within a short period before filing. 
•• "In some cases courts should require the debtor to repay his unsecured creditors in 
full, but that should not necessarily become the norm .... " 126 CONG. R.Ec. Sl5,175 
(daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini) . 
.. See note 51 supra. 
•• 126 CoNG. R.Ec. Sl5,175 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980)(remarks of Sen. DeConcini). 
•• See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra. 
71 See Merrick, supra note 10, at 605. 
71 See, e.g., In re lacavoni, 2 Bankr. Rep. 256 (D. Utah 1980). 
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clearly inadequate plans and thus make the court's determina-
tion of the debtor's ability to pay more significant. It is neces-
sary, therefore, to discuss how a court should address certain as-
pects of the debtor's ability to pay. 
An obvious starting point would be an analysis of the debtor's 
present and future employment prospects. Circumstances affect-
ing the debtor's employment prospects may raise or lower the 
court's determination of what amount constitutes a "bona fide 
effort" for that particular debtor. 
For example, the debtor may have little or no present income 
but anticipate substantial earnings in the near future. Consider 
hypothetical debtors Hand W, a married couple. H has recently 
graduated from medical school and W from law school. They 
have no nonexempt assets and no income. However, they both 
have job offers and plan to begin working in a month or two. 
Their starting salaries are expected to total more than $75,000. 
It would make no sense to take into account only their present 
ability to pay in such circumstances if H and W were to file a 
Chapter 13 plan. 
On the other hand, the debtor might be earning a significant 
amount when he files, but anticipate a decrease in earnings. One 
example would be an auto worker who expects to be laid off in 
the near future. The debtor's ability to pay might be decreased 
due to the fact that he is setting aside a significant amount each 
month from his salary to get him through the layoff. 
The court should also consider the nature of the debtor's em-
ployment. If the debtor· is employed in an industry or trade that 
is seasonal or highly dependent on a particular cyclical market, 
the debtor's present earnings may not represent a true reflection 
of the debtor's ability to make payments over the life of the 
plan. The court could approach this problem two ways. The first 
way would be to take into account only the debtor's p~esent 
earnings. Then if the debtor suffers an unexpected loss of in-
come he could return to the court to have his plan modified78 or 
seek a "hardship discharge."74 The alternative is to attempt to 
determine a reasonable average amount that the debtor might 
be expected to maintain over the life of the plan. The latter 
method would obviously be difficult to administer. However, it 
might be worth the effort if it would avoid situations wherein 
the debtor seeks a "hardship discharge" because of a temporary 
73 11 U.S.C. § 1329 (Supp. III 1979) provides for modification of a plan after 
confirmation. 
74 See note 16 supra. 
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loss of income that may last but a few weeks. 
The court might also want to take into account whether the 
debtor is receiving substantial support from third parties. Con-
sider, for example, a debtor who is supported solely by his par-
ents or the income from a trust. Of course, the court has no 
power to compel contributions from. anyone other than the 
debtor.7G It is debatable, though, whether such a debtor should 
be allowed to claim no ability to pay and thus receive a dis-
charge of his indebtedness with a no-payment plan. 
Finally, the court might also wish to consider whether the 
debtor has the ability to work but has chosen not to. Consider, 
for example, the case of a recent medical school graduate who 
decides to take a year or two off before he begins working. Al-
though he has no income, it cannot be said that his ability to 
pay his debts is zero, since he could easily earn a substantial 
amount if he chose to do so. 
4. The debtor's claimed living expenses and present life-
style- If the debtor claims to have living expenses that seem 
exorbitant, such as $400 per month for food for two adults,76 or 
$300 per month for church tithes,77 the court may require the 
debtor to "pursue a more modest lifestyle. "78 
In addition, the court should determine whether any debts re-
late to luxury items which the debtor intends to keep and enjoy. 
A court should deny Chapter 13 relief to the debtor who wishes 
to continue paying for luxury items at the expense of unsecured 
creditors.79 However, the court's inquiry should go beyond the 
nature of the item in question. The court should take into ac-
count other factors, such as the debtor's reasons for purchasing 
the item, the number of similar items owned by the debtor, and 
how the debtor plans to use it. For example, Senator DeConcini 
states that a Chapter 13 debtor should not be allowed to 
purchase a new car or· continue to make payments on a nearly 
new one at the expense of unsecured creditors. 80 The purchase 
of a new car might be considered a luxury to someone who al-
ready has a good car or who has no need for a new one; on the 
other hand, it might be considered a necessary business expense 
for a traveling salesman or a car dealer. By the same token, that 
traveling salesman does not need a Maserati; the type of car 
71 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(l) (Supp. III 1979). 
78 See In re Schongalla, 6 B.C.D. 408 (D. Md. 1980). 
77 See In re Cadogan, 4 Bankr. Rep. 598 (W.D. La. 1980). 
71 126 CONG. REc. Sl5,l 75 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). 
70 Id. 
00 Id. 
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purchased also seems relevant. The purchase of a hot tub is an-
other example. Under most circumstances a hot tub would be 
considered a definite luxury item. A person suffering from severe 
arthritis might look at it differently. In that case, the court 
should consider whether the tub is truly necessary, and also 
whether a less expensive alternative is available, e.g., a portable 
whirlpool, membership at a local health spa, or available hospi-
tal facilities. 
5. Prior filings in Chapter 13- The "bona fide effort" test 
requires the debtor to make a sincere good faith effort to repay 
creditors with unsecured claims.81 A history of unsuccessful at-
tempts to complete Chapter 13 plans, though not a technical bar 
to further Chapter 13 relief,81 may indicate a lack of sincerity. 
For example, it may appear that the debtor is filing merely to 
take advantage of the automatic stay that protects the debtor 
from formal and informal collection efforts during the life of the 
plan. 83 A plan submitted for such a purpose would violate both 
section 1325(a)(3) and section 1325(a)(4).84 
A history of successful attempts at Chapter 13 relief might 
also raise some questions. A debtor can receive successive Chap-
ter 13 discharges, provided that he successfully completes each 
plan.811 Suppose for example, D, a hypothetical debtor, incurs 
$10,000 in unsecured debts. He then submits a Chapter 13 plan 
which provides for seventy-five percent repayment of his debts. 
The plan is confirmed; D makes the seventy-five percent pay-
ments in six months and receives a discharge of the remaining 
twenty-five percent. During those six months, however, D has 
incurred an additional $10,000 in unsecured debts. So the day 
that he receives his first discharge he files another seventy-five 
percent Chapter 13 plan. Assume that D follows the same proce-
dure every six months for two or three years. The court should 
question whether D is simply using Chapter 13 as part of an 
elaborate discount scheme. In most cases, a seventy-five percent 
repayment plan would probably be considered a prima facie 
•• Id. 
•• See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (Supp. III 1979). 
•• See Id. § 362. 
•• The plan violates section 1325(a)(3) if it appears that the debtor does not intend to 
effectuate it. H.R. REP. No. 96-1195, supra note 38, at 24. The same plan would also 
violate § 1325(a)(4) in that it does not represent a sincere good faith effort to repay 
creditors. See 126 CoNG. REc. S15,175 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980). 
•• Compare 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (Supp. III 1979)(previous discharge in Chapter 7 
within the preceding six years bars the debtor from receiving another Chapter 7 dis-
charge) with 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (Supp. III 1979)(previous discharge in Chapter 13 does not 
act as a bar to further relief in Chapter 13). See also note 16 supra. 
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"bona fide effort." In D's case the court might require a higher 
percentage of repayment, if not complete repayment. 
6. The payment period- Chapter 13 anticipates a three-
year plan,86 but a court should not automatically deny confirma-
tion to one of shorter duration.87 Previously, some debtors pro-
posed plans that were to last only until the debtor had reached 
the "best interest of creditors" limit. 88 The "bona fide effort" 
test would preclude confirmation of such plans. Yet, there still 
may be circumstances that justify a plan of short duration, such 
as the debtor's impending retirement or the anticipated birth of 
a child. 
7. Attorney's fees- The debtor's attorney has priority over 
holders of general unsecured claims. 89 The court should compare 
the amount the debtor proposes to pay the attorney under the 
plan with the amount the debtor proposes to pay to holders of 
general claims. If the attorney's fees significantly reduce the 
debtor's ability to pay other creditors the court should inquire 
into the fee arrangement and reasonableness of the fee. 90 On the 
other hand, if the debtor attempts to make informal arrange-
ments with his creditors before filing and is forced into court 
because they refuse to cooperate, they can hardly complain that 
the debtor's legal expenses have caused them to receive less than 
they would have otherwise. 
8. Exceptional circumstances and other considerations-
Bankruptcy courts should address each of the preceding guide-
lines in every Chapter 13 case. However, the factors represented 
116 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (Supp. III 1979), which limits the duration of the plan to 
three years unless the court, for cause, permits an extension, which cannot exceed two 
years. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1195, supra note 38, at 25. 
87 A plan of short duration should not per se be held to be less than a "bona fide 
effort." A plan that provides for payments totalling 95% of the debtor's indebtedness is 
probably a "bona fide effort" whether stretched out over three months or three years. 
See also In re Markman, 6 B.C.D. 632 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), where the court held that the 
setting of a mandatory time period would amount to involuntary servitude and thus vio-
late the 13th Amendment. The court's reasoning is questionable, however, in light of the 
voluntary nature of Chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (Supp. III 1979). Even after a 
plan is confirmed the debtor is always free to stop paying or to convert his case to a 
Chapter 7 (liquidation) case. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (Supp. III 1979). 
88 See, e.g., In re White, 4 Bankr. Rep. 349 (E.D. Va. 1980)(27-month plan tailored to 
barely meet the "best interest of creditors" test denied confirmation). 
89 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979) requires that the plan provide for full pay-
ment of all claims entitled to priority under§ 507. Section 507(a)(l) grants a priority to 
administrative expenses allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (Supp. III 1979). Section 
503(b)(4) includes reasonable compensation for professional services rendered by an 
attorney. 
00 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(5) (Supp. III 1979), which allows a court to examine the 
claim of a debtor's attorney and to disallow it to the extent that it exceeds the reasona-
ble value of the attorney's services. 
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in these guidelines are not presumed to be exhaustive. The range 
of potentially relevant factors, if not limitless, is bounded only 
by the imagination and resourcefulness of the attorneys who re-
present Chapter 13 debtors and creditors.e1 This guideline leaves 
the court free to address relevant factors that do not relate to 
any of the preceding guidelines. 91 The court should not assume 
that the relevancy of the factor is obvious to other courts: Sub-
sequent courts will appreciate the relevancy of the factor more 
readily if provided with a thorough discussion of the factor by 
the court that suggests it. 
B. The Merits of Uniform Guidelines in Chapter 13 Cases 
Bankruptcy court opm1ons are usually very brief, making it 
difficult, if not impossible, to distill from them the various fac-
tors influencing the court's decision.es When a court does articu-
late the factors it has considered, it too often merely lists them 
and fails to explain how the different factors weighed in the ulti-
mate decision. lM Standard guidelines, such as the set proposed in 
this article, would provide the court with a framework for set-
ting forth the factors it has considered and highlighting their 
relative importance to the particular facts of the case. The 
guidelines would not substantively affect a court's decision; that 
is, they would not tell the court how it must decide. 
01 For an interesting but ironic example, see In re Keckler, 6 B.C.D. 14 (N.D. Ohio 
1980). The debtor had been an employee of a bank and had forged checks at the bank 
totalling $9,363. The bank obtained a judgment against her for the entire amount. After 
she was released from prison she submitted a Chapter 13 plan which proposed repay-
ment of five percent of the debt. The court noted the small percentage of repayment but 
confirmed the plan anyway, finding that due to her past prison record (for forging the 
checks) her employment prospects were limited and thus a five percent plan represented 
her best effort. . 
11 For example, several courts have stated that the nature of the debts covered by the 
plan is relevant to the amount the debtor should be required to pay. This means that a 
court should take into account whether the debts would be nondischargeable under 
Chapter 7. The attitude seems to be that the debtor should pay in proportion to the 
special benefits he wishes to receive from Chapter 13: the more debts the debtor has that 
would be nondischargeable in Chapter 7, the more he should pay to receive a Chapter 13 
discharge. See, e.g., In re Cook, 6 B.C.D. 219 (S.D. W.Va. 1980). This factor was not 
included in the recommended guidelines because there is no indication that Congress 
intended such a factor to be taken into account. The thrust of the "bona fide effort" test 
is to make sure that the debtor makes a sincere effort to pay his creditors; the emphasis 
is put on the relation between the proposed payments and the debtor's ability to pay, 
not on the nature of the debts sought to be discharged. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1195, 
supra note 38, at 24; In re Thorson, 6 Bankr. Rep. 678, 682 (D.S.D. 1980). 
91 See, e.g., In re Webb, 3 Bankr. Rep. 61 (N.D. Cal. 1980) . 
.. See, e.g., In re Iacavoni, 2 Bankr. Rep. 256, 267 (D. Utah 1980). 
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1. Uniformity- Use of such guidelines would promote uni-
form application of the "bona fide effort" test because subse-
quent courts would benefit from knowing how previous courts 
applied the test to different factual settings. In time, a consen-
sus should develop with respect to the relative importance of the 
separate factors. 911 
The use of standard guidelines would also promote the ap-
pearance of uniformity and fairness.88 When conflicting deci-
sions result from the application of a single standard there is a 
danger that the legal system will be perceived as arbitrary and 
capricious. By using the guidelines the judiciary would demon-
strate that its goal is to decide every Chapter 13 case by the 
same standards. A court's discussion of how each guideline re-
lates to the facts of a case would illustrate that conflicting deci-
sions are the result of different factual settings and not the ap-
plication of different judicial standards. 
2. Judicial economy- The use of standard guidelines would 
also promote judicial economy. Since most Chapter 13 debtors 
probably want to get a discharge by paying as little as possible,97 
their estimates of what constitutes a "bona fide effort" are likely 
to be meager. It would be a waste of the debtor's money and the 
.. See In re Bellgraph, 6 B.C.D. 480 (W.D.N.Y. 1980), where the court recognized the 
relevance of the factors set forth in Iacavoni, supra note 94. Bellgraph is noteworthy 
also in that the court gives an unusually detailed recitation of the fact of the case. The 
court's discussion of the facts gives an indication of how it analyzed the Iacavoni factors, 
which are listed later in the opinion. 
" "[The bankruptcy) court must be, and appear to be, a fair and credible forum." 
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 13, at 13 (emphasis added). 
" At least one court's findings tend to prove the validity of this assumption. In In re 
Hurd, 4 Bankr. Rep. 551 (W.D. Mich. 1980), the court compared two groups of wage 
earner plans. The first group was submitted to the court between June 1, 1979, and Sep-
tember 30, 1979. The second group was submitted in March of 1980, under the Reform 
Act. The plans were compared according to the percentage of repayment proposed by 
the debtor. They broke down as follows: 
Amount of Proposed Percentage of 
Repayment Plans Submitted 
100% ...................... . 
50-99% ...................... . 
Group 1 
83% 
0 
Group 2 
5% 
0 
11-49% ....................... · 7% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2% 
~W% .... : .................. 5% ................. M% 
5% or less .. :.................... 2% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53% 
Id. at 559. While any of the new incentives created by the Reform Act would contribute 
to the change in the number of debtors using Chapter 13, see notes 16 & 17 supra, only 
the removal of creditor control could arguably be responsible for this dramatic change in 
the character of the plans submitted. In Judge Nims' words: "Thus, once the necessity of 
obtaining acceptance was removed, many debtors found that they could not pay substan-
tial amounts to unsecured creditors." Id. at 560. 
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· court's time to discover at the confirmation hearing tliat the 
court has an opposite point of view. Of course, it is impossible to 
provide a simple mathematical formula for determining how 
much debtors must propose in order to have their plans con-
firmed. 98 On the other hand, it is possible to inform the debtor 
of the factors the court will consider in making its determina-
tion. If this information-were available, fewer debtors would pro-
pose unrealistic plans and the courts would save the time that 
would otherwise be wasted in futile confirmation hearings. 
3. Facilitation of appellate review- Finally, the use of stan-
dard guidelines would facilitate appellate review of Chapter 13 
cases. Most Chapter 13 appeals will probably involve the court's 
application of the "bona fide effort" test. 99 The appellate court 
will have to determine whether the bankruptcy court abused its 
discretion. It cannot make this determination, however, unless 
the bankruptcy court articulates the factors upon which it based 
its decision. A bankruptcy court can provide this information 
most effectively by adhering to a set of standard guidelines when 
it applies the "bona fide effort" test.100 
"' See notes 47 ~51 and accompanying text supra. 
" This assumption is based on an analysis of the various confirmation criteria con-
tained in § 1325(a). Subsections 1325(a)(l), (2), and (5) are straightforward determina-
tions, as is the "best interest of creditors" portion of subsection (4). The objective char-
acter of these criteria makes it unlikely that there would be any grounds for appealing 
from the court's determination. Subsection 1325(a)(3) is open to argument, because the 
court is called upon to exercise its discretion in· evaluating the debtor's' motives for filing 
in Chapter 13. However, the difficulty of proving an improper motive makes it unlikely 
that this subsection would be th~ source of much litigation. But see In re Goeb, 4 Bankr. 
Rep. 735 (S.D. Cal. 1980), where the court denied confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan on 
the ground that the debtor's sole purpose for filing was to defer certain taxes. Subsection 
1325(a)(6) also gives the court discretion to evaluate the "feasibility" of the plan. While 
this determination is open to argument, the issue is not likely to arise with great fre-
quency. See note 20 supra. This leaves the "bona fide effort" test of § 1325(a)(4). This 
section is likely to foster litigation for two reasons. First, it is highly subjective and thus 
susceptible to conflicting interpretations in different factual settings. Second, it lies at 
the root of most unsecured creditors' objections: they think they are not getting paid 
enough. 
100 For example, see Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 
1974). In Johnson, the district court had awarded attorneys' fees to a successful plaintiff' 
in a case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Fifth Circuit 
remanded the case for reconsideration of the amount of attorneys' fees awarded. The 
court explained that it was impossible to determine whether the district court had 
abused its discretion without knowing the factors which contributed to the decision, and 
upon which specific factors the decision was based. Id. at 717. It ordered the district 
court to reconsider its decision in light of 12 specific guidelines set forth in Ethical Con-
sideration 2-13, Disciplinary Rule 2-106, of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. 
The Johnson guidelines are now recognized and held to be mandatory in eight other 
circuits. See Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 643 (7th Cir. 1977); King v. Green-
blatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1026 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978); Prate v. 
Freedman, 583 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1978); Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 488 (3d Cir. 
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CONCLUSION 
345 
Congress did not intend Chapter 13 to be a haven for debtors 
who wish to receive a discharge of unsecured debts without mak-
ing an honest effort to pay those debts. Unfortunately, the pre-
sent Chapter 13 confirmation criteria do not adequately express 
Congress' intent. As a result, conflicting interpretations of the 
confirmation criteria have caused disparate treatment of Chap-
ter 13 debtors. To prevent future abuse of Chapter 13, Congress 
must first amend the confirmation criteria, adding a "bona fide 
effort" requirement. Further, to insure fair and uniform treat-
ment of Chapter 13 debtors, bankruptcy courts should use a set 
of standard guidelines when applying this "bona fide effort" test. 
Only then will Chapter 13 cease to be "the most misused and 
abused portion of the Bankruptcy Code. "101 
-Stephan M. Vidmar 
1978); Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 (4th Cir. 1978); Allen v. Amalgamated 
Transit Union Local 788, 554 F.2d 876, 884 (8th Cir. 1977); Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, 
Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976); Evans v. Sheraton 
Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
1
•
1 126 CONG. R.Ec. S15,175 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980)(remarks of Sen. DeConcini). 

